NNRU, a noncommutative analogue of NTRU by Vats, Nitin
ar
X
iv
:0
90
2.
18
91
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  1
1 F
eb
 20
09
NNRU, a noncommutative analogue of NTRU
Nitin Vats
Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, India
nitinvatsa@gmail.com
Abstract. NTRU public key cryptosystem is well studied lattice-based
Cryptosystem along with Ajtai-Dwork and GGH systems. Underlying
NTRU is a hard mathematical problem of finding short vectors in a cer-
tain lattice. (Shamir 1997) presented a lattice-based attack by which he
could find the original secret key or alternate key. Shamir concluded if
one designs a variant of NTRU where the calculations involved during
encryption and decryption are non-commutative then the system will
be secure against Lattice based attack.This paper presents a new cryp-
tosystem with above property and we have proved that it is completely
secure against Lattice based attack. It operates in the non-commutative
ring M = Mk(Z)[X]/(X
n
− Ik×k), where M is a matrix ring of k × k
matrices of polynomials in R = Z[X]/(Xn − 1). Moreover We have got
speed improvement by a factor of O(k1.624) over NTRU for the same bit
of information.
Keywords: public key cryptosystem, NTRU, lattice based cryptosystem
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1 Introduction
The first version of NTRU was proposed by (Hoffestein 1996). It has been as-
sessed recently as the fastest public key cryptosystem [1]. Its strong points are
short key size, and speed of encryption and decryption. Two assets of crucial
importance in embarked application like hand held device and wireless systems
. The description of NTRU system is given entirely in terms of quotient ring of
Integer polynomials. The most expected attack on this system is Lattice-based
attack. The NTRU public key cryptosystem [1] relies for its security on the
presumed difficulty of solving the shortest[7,12] and closest vector problem in
certain lattices related to the cyclotomic ring Z[X ]/(Xn−1). Lattices have been
studied by cryptographers for quite some time,both in the field of cryptanalysis
and as a source of hard problems on which to build encryption schemes[1].
By lattice attack our aim is to find the original key or an alternative key
which can be used in place of original key to decrypt ciphertext with some
more computational complexity[3]. We construct a lattice whose elements will
corresponding to alternative key. If we get a vector as short as original key, we
can easily decrypt but even if we find a vector that is two or three times bigger,
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we can partially decrypt it by adding the pieces to get the whole. So added
security can be achieved by increasing the dimensions of the lattice but it will
decrease the speed for encryption and decryption that is the key property of
NTRU.
In this paper we present another variant of NTRU, we will call it NNRU.
Our focus involves extension to noncommutative groups instead of using group
algebra over Zn(that is, the ring Zq[X ]/(X
n − 1) ).
NNRU operates in the ring of k by k matrices of k2 different polynomials
in R = Z[X ]/(Xn − 1) ). As matrix multiplication in NNRU is strictly non-
abelian. Adversary will have to find out two ring elements. So search space will
be square times than that of NTRU. In section 5 we have shown that NNRU
is completely secure against lattice attack that was more likely on NTRU and
its varients.We can compare an instance of NTRU by putting n(k2) = N .
Encryption and decryption in NTRU needs O(N2) or O(nk4) operations for a
message block on length of N but in NNRU for same bit of information we need
O(nk2.376) operations if we use coppersmith algorithms for matrix multiplica-
tion. that is considerable speed improvement over original NTRU. Inversion of
polynomial matrix can be done quickly with less memory-expense by the algo-
rithm suggested in [28]. Moreover polynomial matrix computations can be solved
in O˜(nke)by reducing polynomial matrix multiplication to determinant compu-
tation and conversely, under the straight line model [27]. Here O˜ denotes some
missing log(nk) factors and e is exponent of matrix multiplication over R.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some notation and norm
estimation, that help our analysis . In section 3 we briefly sketch NNRU cryp-
tographic system. In section 4 we discuss constraints for parameters. Details of
the security analysis of NNRU system is given in sections 5. Section 6 shows
performance analysis and comparison with NTRU.
2 Notations
All computations in NNRU are performed in the ring M = Mk(Z)[X ]/(X
n −
Ik×k), where M is a matrix ring of k × k matrices of elements in the ring R =
Z[X ]/(Xn−1). An element a0+a1x+ ...+an−1xn−1 of R can be represented as
n-tuple of integers [a0, a1, ..., an−1]. Addition in R is performed componentwise,
and multiplication is a circular convolution.
2.1 Norm Estimation
We define width of an element M ∈ M to be
‖M‖∞ = Max(coeff.in polys.m ∈M)−Min(coeff.in polys.m ∈M)
The width of matrices M ∈ M is difference between maximum and minimum
coefficient in any of k2 polynomials of it. We say a matrix M ∈M is short if
‖M‖∞ ≤ p.
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The width of the product of two matrices is also be short as it is very less than
q, though it may be slightly more than p. We define width of the polynomial
r ∈ R to be
‖r‖∞ = Max(coeff. in r) −Max(coeff. in r)
Similarly the polynomial r is said to be short if
‖r‖∞ ≤ p.
Basically width of M or r is a sort of L∞ norm on M or R respectively. In
this paper we are essentially using all calculation on the L2 norm to produce
an estimate of its L∞ norm. For precisely evaluating the properties we need to
estimate L∞ but L2 norm is comparatively easy to estimate. We are giving a
proposition between L∞ and L2 norm by which we can do all calculations on
L2 norm and estimate on L∞ norm. It is based on experiments and suggestions
due to Don Coppersmith[1]
Let ‖r‖ be the L2 norm for a random polynomials r. Then following propo-
sition is true for random polynomials r1, r2 ∈ R with small coefficients .
‖r1 ∗ r2‖ ≈ ‖r1‖.‖r2‖
and ‖r1 ∗ r2‖ ∞ ≈ γ‖r1‖.‖r2‖ where, γ < 0.15 for n < 1000. (1)
Now we define a centered L2 norm on M.We denote it by the notation ‖M‖.
‖M‖ =
√ ∑
(polys.m∈M)
∑
(Coeff. in m− µ)2)
where µ = 1nk2
(∑
(polys.m∈M)
∑
(Coeff. in m)
)
is the average of all coef-
ficient in all the polynomial in matrices M . Its value will be close or equal to
zero. Equivalently ‖M‖/
√
nk2 is standard deviation of the coefficients of the
polynomials in M ∈M. In this paper we do analysis on L2 centered norm of M
and can deduce results on L∞ norm by using result (1).
The proposition (1) can be extended to the centered L2 norm onM. Consider
any κ > 0 there are constants γ1, γ2 > 0 and two matrices M1,M2 ∈ M We
therefore express
‖M1 ∗M2‖ ≈ ‖M1‖.‖M2‖
and γ1‖M1‖.‖M2‖ ≤ ‖M1 ∗M2‖∞ ≤ γ2‖M1‖.‖M2‖ (2)
On the basis of experimental evidence and due to Don Coppersmith[1], The
preposition holds good with probability greater than 1 − κ for small κ. It can
be shown experimentally that even for larger value of nk2, the value of γ1/γ2 is
somewhat between zero and one (moderately larger than zero).
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2.2 Sample Spaces
NNRU cryptosystem depends on four positive integer parameters (n, k, p, q) with
p and q relatively prime and four sets of matrices (Lf , Lc, Lφ, Lm) ⊂ M. Note
that q will always be considered much larger than p. In this paper, for ease of
explanation, we stick to p = 2 or 3, and q ranges between 28 to 211. When we
do Matrix multiplication modulo p (or q), we mean to reduce the coefficients of
the polynomial in matrices modulo p (or q).
The set of matrices (Lf , Lc, Lφ, Lm) consists of all matrices of polynomi-
als in the ring R = Z[X ]/(Xn − 1). The set of matrices (Lf , Lc, Lφ) contains
polynomials from the set of polynomials L(d1, d2)
L(d1, d2)
def
= {u ∈ R |u has d1 coeff. equal 1, d2 coeff. equal− 1, and rest 0}.
where, d1 = d2 < n/2 or d1 = d2 ≈ n/p
The space of message Lm consists of all matrices of polynomials with coeffi-
cients modulo p.We therefore express
Lm
def
= {M ∈M|polynomial in M has coeff. lying between − p−12 and p−12 }.
Here we explain individually the meaning and compositions of the all four
sets of matrices (Lf , Lc, Lφ, Lm) ⊂M:
1. Lf with elements f and g, and Lφ with elements φ consist of small matrices
of polynomials f and g, are used to compose private key while φ will be used
as blinding value for each encryption. Lf must satisfy the requirement to
have inverse modulo p and modulo q.
2. element w and c belongs to matrix set Lw and Lc respectively. Lc should
satisfy the requirement that to have inverse modulo p . w and c are used to
construct public key.
3. the set of message Lm consist of matrices of polynomials with coefficients
modulo p .We therefore express
Lm =
{
M ∈M |( Polys.) (in) M ∈
(
−p− 1
2
· · · · · · p− 1
2
)n
⊆ R
}
3 The NNRU System
3.1 Key Creation
To create a NNRU public/private key pair Bob randomly chooses f, g ∈ Lf and
w ∈ Lw and c ∈ Lc. Matrices f must satisfy additional requirement to have
inverse modulo p and q. Matrices g and c should have inverse modulo p . We
denote these inverses by notation Fp, FQ, GP , Cp respectively.
f Fq ≡ I(modq) and g Gp ≡ I(modp)
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Gq g ≡ I(modq) and Cp c ≡ I(modp)
Bob next computes the matrices
h ≡ wGq (modq) (3)
H ≡ Fqc (modq) (4)
Bob publish the pair of matrices (h,H) ∈ M as his public key, retaining
(f, g, c) as his private key. Polynomial Cp and Gp is simply stored for later use.
3.2 Encryption
Suppose Alice(the encryptor)wants to send a message to Bob (the decryptor).
Alice selects a message m from the set of plaintext Lm. Next, Alice randomly
choose a matrices φ ∈ Lφ and use, Bob’s public key (h,H) to compute (the
ciphertext e)
e ≡ pφh+Hm (modq)
Alice then transmit e to Bob. A different random choices of blinding value φ
is made for each plaintext m .
3.3 Decryption
To decrypt the cipher text, Bob first compute
A ≡ feg (modq)
A ≡ f(pφh+Hm)g (modq)
A ≡ fpφhg + fHmg (modq)
A ≡ pfφwGqg + fFqcmg (modq)
A ≡ pfφw + cmg (modq)
Where he choose the coefficients of the polynomials of the matrices A to lie
in interval of −q/2 to q/2 . Why decryption works? Matrices φ, g, f , m, c and
w have polynomials with small coefficients and p is much smaller than q. It is
highly probable for the appropriate parameter choice of the members, matrices
pfφw+cmg, before reducing mod q, has polynomials with coefficients of absolute
value less than q/2. Bob next computes the matrices B
B ≡ A(modp)
B ≡ cmg(modp)
He reduces each coefficient of the element of A to modulo p . Finally Bob uses
his other private keys Cp and Gp to recover the original message.
C ≡ CpcmgGp(modp)
C ≡ m(modp)
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The matrix C will be the original message m as
polynomial in m ∈
(
−p− 1
2
· · · · · · p− 1
2
)n
⊆ R
4 Parameter Constraint
Our selection is based on the following three requirements
1. fφw and cmg should be small in order for decryption to work.
2. Appropriate selection of f , g and c prevent a private key attack.
3. Appropriate selection of φ and m prevent plain text attack.
The key point is that decryption will only work if fφw and cmg are not too
large so we want to keep |pfφw + cmg|∞ should be small. For security reasons,
it is important that w, remains secret from attacker. On average |w| ≈ |m|. this
type of selection follows
|pfφw| ≈ |cmg|
As already described that we are selecting f , g from Lf , c from Lc and w
from Lw , m from Lm which gives d1 = d2 ≈ n/p ; that ensure to maximize the
number of possible choices for polynomials of these matrices.
5 Cryptanalysis
5.1 Brute Force Attacks
To decrypt the cipher text, attackers need to know the private key f , g and c
correctly. Attacker can try all possible f, g ∈ Lf so that hg (modq) should have
polynomials with small entries or by finding all g ∈ Lf and testing if fH ( mod q)
have polynomial with small entries. Out of these small fH (modq), one will be
c (modq). So attacker need to search pair of (f, g). f and g are determined by
2k2 polynomials, each of them having maximum degree (n− 1). so the number
of possible (f, g) pairs are
Key Security =
[
n!
(n− 2df )!df !2
]2k2
Here df and dφ are defined by assuming Lf and Lφ contains polynomials
from the set of polynomials L(df , df ) and L(dφ, dφ) respectively. By analogy,
the same attack can also be done against a given message by testing all possible
φ ∈ Lφ and search for the matrices e − φh(modQ) which contains polynomials
with small entries. So individual message security is defined by
Message Security =
[
n!
(n− 2dφ)!dφ!2
]2k2
A meet-in-middle attack was proposed by Andrew Odlyzko [13] for NTRU
and developed by Silverman. This attack can also be used against NNRU. The
attack need a lot of storage capacity and cut the search time by the square root.
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5.2 Multiple Transmission Attack
This attack works if Alice sends a single message m several time using same
public key but different blinding values φ’s, then the attacker eve can get the
maximum bits of the message.
suppose Alice transmit the massage
ei ≡ φih+Hm(modq)
for i = 1, 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . r
eve can compute (ei− e1) ∗h−1(modq). therefore recovering φi−φ1(modq).
If r is of moderate size (say 5 or 6), eve will recover enough bits of φ1to apply
brute force to the rest of the bits. As polynomial of φ have small coefficients
so eve will recover exactly φi − φ1, and in the way eve will recover many of
coefficients of polynomial of φ1
due to this attack we suggest not to use multiple transmission with further
scrambling of particular (underlying) message. However this attack will work
for a single message(tha has been multiple transmitted)not for any subsequent
message.
5.3 Lattice Attack
The Decryptor computes
A = feg ≡ pfφw + cmg (modq)
parameter are chosen so that both pfφw and cmg are small enough to guar-
antee the entries of non modular expression
B = pfφw + cmg (modq)
lies between −q/2 and q/2 most of the time. In this case decryptor can switch
to compute modulo p from computing modulo q and can calculate message.
m ≡ CpBGp (modp)
we can estimate bounds on the elements of B provided correct decryption. De-
cryption will work only when B is equal to pfφw+ cmg, not mere congruent to
modulo q. Using result(2)we can say the following
‖ pfφw ‖≈ p ‖ f ‖‖ φ ‖‖ w ‖
‖ cmg ‖≈‖ c ‖‖ m ‖‖ g ‖
Assuming vectors pfφw and cmg to be nearly orthogonal, we can write
‖ B ‖2≈ p2 ‖ f ‖2‖ φ ‖2‖ w ‖2 + ‖ c ‖2‖ m ‖2‖ g ‖2 (5)
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decoding will fail if any coefficient of polynomial of B will more than q/2
in absolute value. Make the second assumption that the entries of polynomials
in matrices B are normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation
σ ≈ ‖B‖√
nk2
. Analogues to shamir’s results for NTRU [1], Experiments suggests
the fact that the probability of correct decoding is high for small ratio of σ to
q/2. We can say that reliability of decoding is directly proportional to the ratio
of σ ≈ ‖B‖√
nk2
to q
Equation (5) gives an estimate of the value of B in terms of f, w, c and g.
Let us consider the case in which attacker can use an alternate matrices f ′ in
place of original f and g′ in place of g. Upon calculate from a value of w′ from
equation (3) and c′ from equation (4), an estimate of ‖ B′ ‖ can be calculated
by equation (5). If this ‖ B′ ‖ is comparable to ‖ B ‖, then it is not tough to
recover message using f ′ and g′ so consider
‖ B ‖2≈ p2 ‖ f ‖2‖ φ ‖2‖ w ‖2 + ‖ c ‖2‖ m ‖2‖ g ‖2
Assume ‖ φ ‖ and ‖ m ‖ to be held constant at a typical value, and putting
λ =‖ m ‖ /p ‖ φ ‖, putting the value of λ in above equation, we therefore left
with
σ2 =
‖ B′ ‖2
nk2
≈
(
p2‖ φ ‖2
nk2
)
(‖ f ′ ‖2‖ w′ ‖2 + λ2‖ c′ ‖2‖ g′ ‖2)
We can attack this cryptosystem if we can make a lattice L in which squared
norm of an element being
‖ f ‖2‖ w ‖2 + ‖ c ‖2‖ g ‖2
In other words if we can construct a lattice from public key pair h,H in
which vector (fw, cg) lies or if we show vectors fw and cg to be same linear
transformation of public key vectors. In following analysis we show that we
can’t make such lattice that will generated by public key and contain vectors
(fw, cg).
Encrypted message is left multiplied by f and right multiplied by g. fw and
cg are produced by following transformation on public keys.
Tf,g(1) : 1 7→ f g
We can define Tf,g :M →M be the linear map
h 7→ fhg or h 7→ fw (6)
H 7→ fHg or H 7→ cg (7)
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For further analysis Let us consider the definition of a lattice. Let IRm be the
m-dimensional Euclidian space. A lattice in IRmis the set
L(b1, b2, b3, . . . . . . , bn) =
{
n∑
i=1
xibi : xi ∈ ZZ
}
of all integer combination of n-linear independent vectors {b1, b2, b3, . . . . . . , bn}
in IRm(m ≥ n). Here we try to make a Lattice of dimensions 2nk2 × 2nk2 with
basis vectors produced by the cyclic shift of the coefficients of polynomial of the
matrices h and H . Attacker can crack the system provided the Lattice contains
vector (fw, cg).
One can conclude by linear transformation shown in equation (6) and (7) that
the lattice attack is possible if and only if one can make a lattice with public
key vectors (h,H) which contains vector (fw, cg) or if following transformation
is linear
(h,H) 7→ (fw, cg) (8)
In following analysis we show transformation h 7→ fhg is not linear. Similarly
it follows H 7→ fhg and (h,H) 7→ (fw, cg) can not be linear.
Consider the multiplication of the matrices f.h.g = fw, where each matrix
(f, g, h, fw)having k2 short polynomials as elements


f1 · · · fk
...
. . .
...
fk(k−1) · · · fk2




h1 · · · hk
...
...
...
hk(k−1) · · · hk2




g1 · · · gk
...
...
...
gk(k−1) · · · gk2

 =


fw1,1 · · · fw1,k
...
...
...
fwk,1 · · · fwk,k


(fw)1,1 = g1 f1h1 + gk+1f1h2 + g2k+1f1h3 + · · ·+ gk(k−1)+1f1hk + g1f2hk+1
+ · · ·+ gk(k−1)+1f2h2k + · · ·+ gk(k−1)+1fkhk2
(fw)1,2 = g2 f1h1 + · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·+ gk(k−1)+2fkhk2
...
(fw)k,k = gk h1fk(k−1)+1 + g2kh2fk(k−1)+1 + · · ·+ gk2hkfk(k−1)+1 + · · · gk2hk2fk2
So general term can be represented as
(fw)i,j =
ki∑
l=k(i−1)+1
k−1∑
s=0
fl(gj+sk)
(
h(1+s)(l−k(i−1))
)
or, we can represent (fw)i,j =
∑
fugvhz =
∑
Uzhz where, u, v, and z are
according to the relationship shown above,
Here i, j ∈ [1 k2]; u, v ∈ [1 k2]; z ∈ [1 k4]
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As all Uz are different so we can not find a row vector Si = (s1, s2, . . . . . . , sk2)
that will produce vector fw on multiplying with a Lattice represented by the
cyclic shift of the coefficients of polynomial of h. In other words if column vectors
v1, v2, . . . . . . vnk2 are the basis of lattice L(v1, v2, . . . . . . vnk2), then we will have
to multiply different vector Si to each column vector vi to get fw. We therefore
conclude
fw 6= Si L(v1, v2, . . . . . . vnk2)
Thus we proved that one cannot make a lattice by h and H , which contains
the vectors (fw, cg). So lattice attack will not work for this cryptosystem unlike
NTRU[1] and its variants [14].
6 Comparison of Security and Speed of NNRU with
Other Variants of NTRU
Many variants of NTRU have been introduced till date. We present NNRU as
the only variant of NTRU which operates in non-commutative ring. It is com-
pletely secure against Lattice attack. Moreover it gives speed improvement over
NTRU. Brief of other variants are as follows.
1. Variant with non-invertible polynomial [25]: It operates in ring
Z[X ]/(XN − 1) . Size of public key and encryption time is roughly doubled
than NTRU. It is likely to be more robust against Lattice attack but not proved.
2. MaTRU [14]: It operates in a ring of k × k matrices of polynomials in
R = Z[X ]/(Xn−1) but decryption is not non-commutative. Speed improvement
is achieved by a factor of O(k). It gives no added security against lattice or other
attacks in comparison with NTRU.
3. CTRU [24]: It is analogue of NTRU, the ring of integers replaced by the
ring of polynomials IF2[T ]. It has been completely cracked by linear algebra at-
tack.
As [25] is slow and [24] is completely cracked so it is obvious to give more
attention to the study of security aspect of MaTRU. Here we present meet-in-
middle attack on MaTRU and show that the MaTRU system is not more robust
against this attack compare to NTRU. This attack can’t be operated on NNRU
because calculations involved in decryption are non-commutating. [26] shows
meet-in-middle attack on NTRU. We show that similar attack can be applied
on MaTRU.
Applying same notations as in [14] let us consider Second block of MaTRU
Lattice [14].
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w (modq) =


γ0,0
γ0,1
...
...
γk−1,k−1


T


h
h≫ 1
h≫ 2
...
h≫ k2 − 1


nk2 coefficients of w can be achieved by multiplying row vector γ to matrix h.
Idea is to search for γ in the form γ1||γ2, where γ1 and γ2 are each of nk2/2
length with d/2 ones and “||” denotes concatenation, and then to match (γ1 ∗h)
against (−γ2 ∗h), looking for (γ1, γ2) so that the corresponding coefficients have
approximately the same value. The above relationship can be written as
⇒ (γ1 ∗ h)i = {0, 1} − (γ2 ∗ h)i (modq)∀i
where, the ai notation denotes the i
th entry in a.
This equation is similar to what we get for NTRU [26].
⇒ (f1 ∗ h)i = {0, 1} − (f2 ∗ h)i (modq)∀i
We can operate the attack same as [26]. Assuming nk2 = N and d are number
of ones in γ. Similar to [26], One can easily find that the expected running
time and storage space required for this method (this value is equal to what
we get for NTRU)is
(
N/2
d/2
)
/
√
N . Further one can also apply meet-in-middle
attack on MaTRU followed by Linear algebra attack. Lattice in [14] can also be
represented as modular equation γ(y) ∗ h(y) ≡ w(modq)(mod(yk2 − 1)). It can
also be written as
γ(y) ∗ h(y) = w + qu
where, u = u0,0 + u0,1 + · · ·+ uk−1,k−1yk2−1 and, ui,j ∈ Z[X ]/(Xn − 1). Above
system of linear equations consist of 3nk2−1 variable in nk2−1 linear equations.
If nk2 − 1 is not fairly large than the system of linear equations can be used to
reduce an exhaustive search to a space of size 2nk
2−1. further one can set up a
meet in middle search to reduce the running time to O(2(nk
2−1)/2).
7 Performance Analysis and Comparison with NTRU
Here we present the theoretical operating specification of NNRU and compare
the complexity of different operation with standard NTRU PKCS. NNRU cryp-
tosystem depends on four positive integer parameters (n, k, p, q) with p and q
relatively prime and four sets of matrices (Lf , Lc, Lφ, Lm) ⊂M .The properties
of NTRU [1] is defined in terms of parameters (N, p, q). We compare two systems
for the same size of plaintext blocks by setting N = nk2.
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Characteristics NTRU NNRU
Plain text Block N log2 p bits nk
2 log2 p bits
Encrypted Text Block N log2 q bits nk
2 log2 q bits
Encryption Speed O(N2) operations O(n2k3) operations
Message Expansion logp q to 1 logp q to 1
Private Key Length 2N log2 p bits 2nk
2 log2 p bits
Public Key Length N log2 q bits 2nk
2 log2 q bits
Lattice Security 2
(
pi2ae2
3Nq2
) 1
4
Totally secure against lattice attack
1Since NNRU perform two-sided multiplication during decryption process,
so constant factor will about twice that of standard NTRU
2 For message security dg will be replaced by d for NTRU and df to dφ for
NNRU Cryptosystem
If we compare the size of public/private key, NNRU needs two public keys
each of them is double in length that of NTRU public key while the size of private
key is same. NNRU gives significant speed improvement over standard NTRU.
We can compare an instance of NTRU by putting n(k2) = N . Encryption and
decryption in NTRU needs O(N2) or O(nk4) operations for a message block
on length of N . In NNRU the same bit of information requires O(nk2.807) or
O(nk2.376) operations if we use Strassen’s or coppersmith algorithms for matrix
multiplication respectively. We can further reduce the number of operations if
we use FFT for polynomial multiplication. In this case it will be as small as
O(k2.376nlogn), which is considerable speed improvement over original NTRU. It
is faster than RSA which needs O(N3)operations for encryption and decryption.
8 Conclusion
Our motivation for NNRU results from various suggestions given by Shamir and
other researchers in their papers for extensions to non-commutative groups. We
studied NTRU over ring F2(T )[X ]/(X
n− 1) but we found that, the variant [24]
is secure against Popov Normal Form attack but completely insecure against
linear algebra based attacks . Here we follow group algebra over strictly non-
commutative groups. Lattice attack is biggest threat to NTRU. It is expected
that new lattice reduction technique will be discovered over time and will be able
to reduce number of arithmetic operations involved in it. It is natural to study
an analogue of NTRU in the given context and find the possibilities in terms of
security against Lattice attack and any improvement in terms of speed. NNRU
is completely secure against Lattice attacks with significant speed improvement.
Further research can be done in the direction of finding the possibilities of any
other type of attack or further improvement and generalization of NNRU Cryp-
tosystem.
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